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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge 
 
 Enacted to combat credit card and identity theft, the Fair 
and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 (FACTA) 
prohibits anyone who accepts credit or debit cards as payment 
from printing more than the last five digits of a customer’s 
credit card number on the receipt. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g). 
Plaintiff-Appellant Ahmed Kamal brought this suit after 
receiving three receipts from Defendants-Appellees J. Crew 
Group, Inc. (and related entities) that included both the first six 
and last four digits of his credit card number. The District Court 
dismissed Kamal’s suit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(1) for lack of Article III standing based on its 
determination that Kamal did not suffer a concrete injury from 
the alleged violation.   
 
We agree, and we will affirm on that issue. We will 
vacate and remand, however, for the District Court to dismiss 





 We begin with a review of FACTA’s text and 
background before turning to the facts and procedural history.   
 
A. 
Congress enacted FACTA in 2003 as an amendment to 
the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681. 
FACTA was part of Congress’s effort to prevent identity theft. 
Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952. Consistent with that 
purpose, one of its provisions regulates the information that 
can be included on receipts given to customers: 
 
Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, 
no person that accepts credit cards or debit cards 
for the transaction of business shall print more 
than the last 5 digits of the card number or the 
expiration date upon any receipt provided to the 
cardholder at the point of the sale or transaction. 
 
15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(1). This provision was “included . . . to 
limit the number of opportunities for identity thieves to ‘pick 
off’ key card account information.” S. Rep. No. 108-166, at 13 
(2003). 
 
FACTA provides for actual damages and attorneys’ fees 
and costs to remedy negligent violations. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1681o(a). Willful violators are liable for “any actual 
damages . . . or damages of not less than $100 and not more 
than $1,000,” punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs. 
Id. § 1681n(a).   
 
 In 2008, Congress passed the Credit and Debit Card 
Receipt Clarification Act (Clarification Act), which provided a 
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temporary safe harbor to merchants that had violated FACTA 
by including card expiration dates on receipts. Pub. L. No. 110-
241, 122 Stat. 1565. Although FACTA requires truncation of 
card numbers and removal of expiration dates, Congress found 
many merchants mistakenly believed it only required card 
number truncation, leading to “hundreds of lawsuits” alleging 
these merchants’ willful failure to remove the expiration date. 
Id. § 2(a)(3)–(4). According to Congress, these suits did not 
contain “allegation[s] of harm to any consumer’s identity,” and 
“[e]xperts in the field agree that proper truncation of the card 
number . . . regardless of the inclusion of the expiration date, 
prevents a potential fraudster from perpetrating identity theft.” 
Id. § 2(a)(5)–(6). To ensure “consumers suffering from any 
actual harm to their credit or identity are protected while 
simultaneously limiting abusive lawsuits that do not protect 
consumers,” id. § 2(b), the Clarification Act amended FACTA 
so merchants who printed expiration dates but otherwise 
complied with FACTA would not be deemed in willful 
noncompliance, id. § 3; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(d). This 
safe harbor covers receipts printed between 2004 and 2008. 
Clarification Act § 3; 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(d). 
 
B. 
On December 18, 2014, Kamal visited a J. Crew retail 
store in Ocean City, Maryland, and made a purchase with a 
credit card. Four days later, he went to another J. Crew store in 
Rehoboth Beach, Delaware, and again made a credit card 
purchase. Finally, about two weeks later, Kamal went to a J. 
Crew store in Wayne, New Jersey, and made a third purchase. 
Each time, Kamal “received an electronically printed receipt,” 
which he retained, that “display[ed] the first six digits of [his] 
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credit card number as well as the last four digits.”1 App. 97, 
Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 8. As Kamal notes, the first six digits 
identify the issuing bank and card type. The receipts he 
received also identified his card issuer, Discover, by name. 
Kamal does not allege anyone (other than the cashier) saw his 
receipts. Neither does he allege his identity was stolen nor that 
his credit card number was misappropriated. 
 
Six days after the last purchase, Kamal filed his first 
Class Action Complaint, alleging J. Crew willfully violated 
FACTA by including on his receipts the first six digits of his 
credit card number. Kamal sought statutory and punitive 
damages as well as attorneys’ fees. J. Crew filed a motion to 
dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), 
arguing its violations had not been willful. Kamal filed an 
Amended Complaint, and J. Crew again moved to dismiss on 
the same grounds. The District Court denied the motion, 
concluding Kamal plausibly alleged a willful violation. 
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. 
Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016), J. Crew moved to dismiss for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), 
contending Kamal lacked standing because he did not suffer a 
“concrete” injury. The District Court agreed that Kamal had 
not alleged a sufficiently concrete injury and thus lacked 
standing under Article III. It granted J. Crew’s motion without 
prejudice and allowed Kamal to file another amended 
complaint. 
 
                                              
1 We note that Kamal did not attach copies of the receipts to 
his Second Amended Complaint. But he did attach them to 
previous Complaints he filed, which are included in the Joint 
Appendix. 
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Kamal filed his Second Amended Complaint—the 
operative complaint in this matter. In an effort to address the 
deficiencies leading to the dismissal of his Amended 
Complaint, Kamal alleges two “concrete” harms: “the printing 
of the prohibited information itself and the harm caused by 
such printing increasing the risk of identity theft.” App. 104, 
Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 36. To support these allegations, Kamal 
contends “[t]he extensive legislative findings by Congress, the 
Federal Trade Commission, the Department of Justice, and the 
industry” demonstrate that J. Crew’s conduct “created a real, 
non-speculative harm in the form of increased risk of identity 
theft.” Id. The Complaint accordingly includes statements from 
Congress, industry experts, and government officials to show 
FACTA was intended to address identity theft. For example, 
Kamal notes that “[e]xperts . . . told Congress that both non-
redacted Card numbers and expiration dates are particularly 
dangerous in the hands of sophisticated criminals.” App. 104, 
Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 37. Similarly, Kamal says, “the Senate 
found that the specific provision at issue here protected 
consumers, like Plaintiff, from an intangible harm in the form 
of enhanced risk of identity theft.” App. 106, Sec. Am. Compl. 
¶ 41. 
 
The Complaint also explains how FACTA’s truncation 
requirement responds to identity theft. Kamal alleges that 
“[o]ne common modus operandi of identity thieves is to obtain 
Card receipts that are lost or discarded, or through theft, and 
use the information on them to commit fraud and theft.” App. 
101, Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 28. FACTA “makes it more difficult 
for identity thieves to obtain consumers’ Card information by 
reducing the amount of information identity thieves could 
retrieve from found or stolen Card receipts.” App. 103, Sec. 
Am. Compl. ¶ 33. In other words, Congress was responding to 
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“the possibility that identity thieves would be able to piece 
together credit card numbers and expiration dates to invade 
consumers’ privacy and exploit their financial resources.” App. 
106, Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 42. 
 
Notwithstanding these additional allegations, J. Crew 
again moved to dismiss on standing grounds. The District 
Court noted the two injuries alleged in the Second Amended 
Complaint—the printing of the prohibited information and the 
increased risk of identity theft—and rejected both in turn. See 
Kamal v. J. Crew Grp., Inc., No. 15-0190, 2017 WL 2587617, 
at *3 (D.N.J. June 14, 2017).2 
 
The court first held the printing of the information on 
the receipt was not itself a concrete injury. J. Crew’s conduct 
in giving Kamal a receipt that included his credit card’s first 
six digits did “not implicate traditional common law privacy 
interests” because “J. Crew did not ‘disclose’ Kamal’s personal 
information” and “the [card’s] first six digits do not pertain to 
the customer’s individual bank account.” Id. As to “the 
judgment of Congress,” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549, the court—
relying on quoted portions of the Clarification Act—
determined that “Congress sought [through FACTA] to ‘ensure 
that consumers suffering from any actual harm to their credit 
or identity are protected,’” Kamal, 2017 WL 2587617, at *4 
(quoting Clarification Act § 2(b)) (emphasis added in District 
Court opinion). Because Kamal had not sustained any actual 
harm, the court held there was no injury in fact. 
 
                                              
2 Because the District Court subsequently reissued an identical 
opinion, dismissing Kamal’s Second Amended Complaint 
with prejudice, we cite to the reissued opinion. 
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The District Court next evaluated whether Kamal’s 
alleged increased risk of identity theft constituted a concrete 
injury. The court was unable to “reasonably infer that printing 
the first six and last four digits of [Kamal’s] credit card 
materially increased the risk of future harm.” Id. at *4. The 
court stated that the first six digits of a credit card number 
identify the bank or card issuer, information that permissibly 
appears elsewhere on a receipt. It also examined the 
intervening events that must occur for Kamal’s identity to be 
stolen and found this chain of future events too speculative to 
constitute a concrete injury.  
 
Accordingly, because Kamal had alleged only a 
technical violation of FACTA and not a concrete injury, the 
District Court held Kamal lacked standing and granted J. 
Crew’s motion, dismissing without prejudice the Second 
Amended Complaint. The District Court gave Kamal leave to 
file another amended complaint. 
 
Kamal moved for reconsideration, or alternatively, for 
amendment of the court’s order “so as to redenominate it final 
and appealable,” as Kamal intended to stand on the Second 
Amended Complaint to establish his Article III standing. Pl.’s 
Mem. of Law Supp. Mot. Reconsider at 5, Kamal v. J. Crew 
Grp., Inc., D. Ct. Dkt. No. 87-1, Civ. No. 15-0190 (D.N.J. June 
8, 2017). The District Court denied the motion for 
reconsideration but amended its order to provide for a 
dismissal with prejudice based on Kamal’s intent to stand on 
his complaint. Kamal appealed, and J. Crew filed a cross-
appeal challenging the District Court’s denial of its motion to 




 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331 to resolve the question of standing. We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
 
 “Our review of the District Court’s dismissal of a 
complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) 
is de novo.” In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach 
Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 632 (3d Cir. 2017). The District Court 
properly determined that J. Crew’s Motion was a facial 
challenge because it did “not dispute what [the] facts are, but 
rather whether the facts as plead [sic] create standing.” Kamal, 
2017 WL 2587617, at *2; see also Constitution Party of Pa. v. 
Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 358 (3d Cir. 2014) (“In reviewing a 
facial attack, ‘the court must only consider the allegations of 
the complaint and documents referenced therein and attached 
thereto, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’” (quoting 
In re Schering Plough Corp. Intron/Temodar Consumer Class 
Action, 678 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir. 2012))). “Although ‘general 
factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s 
conduct may suffice,’” Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 
41 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 
555, 561 (1992)), “the complaint must still ‘clearly and 
specifically set forth facts sufficient to satisfy’ Article III,” id. 
(quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)). 
 
III. 
 Kamal pleaded an injury which no doubt involves a 
technical violation of FACTA’s ban on printing more than the 
last five digits of a consumer’s credit card number. We must 
resolve whether the alleged resulting harm is sufficiently 




“Under Article III of the United States Constitution, the 
power of the judiciary ‘extends only to “Cases” and 
“Controversies.”’” Long v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 903 F.3d 
312, 320 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547). 
“One element of the case-or-controversy requirement is that 
[plaintiffs], based on their complaint, must establish that they 
have standing to sue.” Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 
(1997). The standing doctrine “limits the category of litigants 
empowered to maintain a lawsuit in federal court” and has 
“developed in our case law to ensure that federal courts do not 
exceed their authority as it has been traditionally understood.” 
Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547. To maintain a suit, a “plaintiff must 
have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to 
the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely 
to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Id. This 
appeal involves only the injury-in-fact requirement.   
 
To show injury in fact, a plaintiff must allege “‘an 
invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and 
particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or 
hypothetical.’” Id. at 1548 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). 
“Th[e] injury . . . must be concrete in both a qualitative and 
temporal sense,” and an “abstract” injury will not suffice. 








In Spokeo, the Supreme Court considered Congress’s 
ability to confer standing for intangible harms, and it 
established criteria for evaluating whether those harms satisfy 
Article III. 136 S. Ct. at 1549. The plaintiff alleged the 
defendant, which operates a “people search engine,” violated 
the FCRA when it published inaccurate information about him 
on the Internet. Id. at 1544. On appeal, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined the plaintiff 
satisfied the injury-in-fact requirement because a “violation of 
a statutory right is usually a sufficient injury in fact to confer 
standing.” Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 412 (9th Cir. 
2014), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). The Supreme Court 
vacated and remanded the decision of the Ninth Circuit, 
explaining that “Article III standing requires a concrete injury 
even in the context of a statutory violation.” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. 
at 1549. To assess whether an intangible harm constitutes an 
injury in fact, the Supreme Court directed courts to look both 
at the “judgment of Congress” and at history. Id. 
 
The congressional inquiry considers whether Congress 
has “identif[ied] and elevat[ed]” an intangible harm because, 
as the Supreme Court recognized, “Congress is well positioned 
to identify intangible harms that meet minimum Article III 
requirements” and “its judgment is . . . instructive and 
important.” Id. The historical inquiry considers “whether an 
alleged intangible harm has a close relationship to a harm that 
has traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a 
lawsuit in English or American courts.” Id. This comparison is 
useful because the Article III case-or-controversy requirement 
“is grounded in historical practice.” Id. 
 
The Supreme Court cautioned that a plaintiff does not 
“automatically satisf[y] the injury-in-fact requirement 
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whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and 
purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right.” 
Id. Congress cannot statutorily manufacture Article III 
standing in the case of “a bare procedural violation, divorced 
from any concrete harm.” Id. Rather, a procedural violation 
must yield or risk actual harm to meet the requirements of 
Article III.  
 
The Spokeo Court traced this limitation back to 
Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488 (2009), where 
the Court explained: 
 
[D]eprivation of a procedural right without some 
concrete interest that is affected by the 
deprivation—a procedural right in vacuo—is 
insufficient to create Article III standing. Only a 
“person who has been accorded a procedural 
right to protect his concrete interests can assert 
that right without meeting all the normal 
standards for redressability and immediacy.” 
 
Id. at 496 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7) (emphasis added 
in Summers). When a procedural right protects a concrete 
interest, a violation of that right may create a sufficient “risk of 
real harm” to the underlying interest to “satisfy the requirement 
of concreteness.” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549; cf. Strubel v. 
Comenity Bank, 842 F.3d 181, 190 (2d Cir. 2016). In Spokeo, 
the Court remanded for the Ninth Circuit to address whether 
the alleged procedural violations “entail a degree of risk 
sufficient to meet the concreteness requirement.” 136 S. Ct. at 
1550. It explained that some FCRA violations, such as 
“dissemination of an incorrect zip code,” would not suffice 




We have applied these principles in four cases. First, in 
Horizon, after unencrypted laptop computers containing the 
plaintiffs’ personal information were stolen from a Horizon 
facility, the plaintiffs sued under the FCRA. 846 F.3d at 630. 
They contended the company inadequately safeguarded their 
personal information. Id. at 630–31. We determined the 
plaintiffs had standing because their alleged injury—
unauthorized dissemination of their personal information—
was identified by Congress as a cognizable injury under the 
FCRA, id. at 639, and involved harm that had “long been seen 
as injurious,” id. at 638. Under Spokeo, the violation of the 
plaintiffs’ “statutory right to have their personal information 
secured against unauthorized disclosure” was, “in and of itself, 
an injury in fact.” Id. at 634; see also In re Nickelodeon 
Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 274 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(concluding the “unlawful disclosure of legally protected 
information” in and of itself constitutes a “de facto injury”).  
 
Second, in Susinno v. Work Out World Inc., 862 F.3d 
346 (3d Cir. 2017), the plaintiff alleged a single prerecorded 
call to her cell phone was a violation of the Telephone 
Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). Id. at 351. We recognized 
that Congress had “squarely identified” the plaintiff’s injury in 
the TCPA. Id. Because the injury was closely related to a 
common law intrusion upon seclusion claim, Congress was 
able to elevate the harm—although intangible—to a “legally 




Third, in St. Pierre v. Retrieval-Masters Creditors 
Bureau, 898 F.3d 351 (3d Cir. 2018), the plaintiff alleged the 
defendant debt collection agency violated the Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) when it disclosed his debtor 
account number through a glassine window on an envelope 
sent to him through the mail. Id. at 355–56. Noting Horizon’s 
statement that “unauthorized dissemination of personal 
information . . . causes an injury in and of itself,” we concluded 
the plaintiff had standing. Id. at 357 (quoting Horizon, 846 
F.3d at 639). The exposure of the account number 
“‘implicate[d] a core concern animating the FDCPA—the 
invasion of privacy’—and thus [wa]s closely related to” a 
traditional harm. Id. at 357–58 (quoting Douglass v. 
Convergent Outsourcing, 765 F.3d 299, 303 (3d Cir. 2014)). 
 
Finally, in Long, the plaintiffs alleged defendant 
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) 
violated the FCRA in two ways. First, “SEPTA did not send 
[them] copies of their background checks before it decided not 
to hire them” on the basis of those background checks. Long, 
903 F.3d at 317. We determined this injury was sufficiently 
concrete because the FRCA clearly expressed Congress’s 
intent to make the injury redressable, and the alleged 
interference with the plaintiffs’ ability to control their personal 
information was “analogous” to common law invasions of 
privacy rights. Id. at 323–24. But the second alleged 
violation—that SEPTA did not send the plaintiffs notice of 
their FCRA rights—was a “bare procedural violation” for 
which there was no standing. Id. at 325 (quoting Spokeo, 136 
S. Ct. at 1549). Although the plaintiffs alleged the violation 
increased the risk that their claims would lapse before they 
could bring suit, we determined there was no harm because the 
16 
plaintiffs “became aware of their FRCA rights and were able 
to file [a] lawsuit.” Id. 
 
 We have not yet had occasion to review standing where 
a procedural violation allegedly presents a “material risk of 
harm” because, in these past cases, the underlying harm 
contemplated by Congress had already materialized or failed 
to materialize. See Long, 903 F.3d at 324 (plaintiffs alleged the 
defendant took an adverse employment action without 
providing the required consumer report, “the very harm that 
Congress sought to prevent”) (internal quotation omitted); St. 
Pierre, 898 F.3d at 358 (plaintiff alleged unauthorized 
disclosure of debtor account number, and “invasion of privacy” 
was “a core concern animating the FDCPA”) (internal 
quotation omitted); Susinno, 862 F.3d at 351 (plaintiff asserted 
nuisance and invasion of privacy, “the very harm that Congress 
sought to prevent” with the TCPA) (internal quotation 
omitted); Horizon, 846 F.3d at 640 (plaintiffs alleged the 
unauthorized dissemination of their own private information, 
“the very injury that FCRA is intended to prevent”). This was 
in keeping with the Supreme Court’s statement that if violation 
of a statutory right itself constitutes injury in fact, “a plaintiff . 
. . need not allege any additional harm beyond the one 
Congress has identified.” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549. 
 
Our precedent recognizes, though, “that there are some 
circumstances where the mere technical violation of a 
procedural requirement of a statute cannot, in and of itself, 
constitute an injury in fact.” Horizon, 846 F.3d at 638. 
Although we then had “no occasion to consider” those 
“limiting circumstances,” we are now presented with a case 
that requires us to “consider the full reach of congressional 
power to elevate a procedural violation into an injury in fact.” 
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Id. We—like several of our sister circuits—understand Spokeo 
“to instruct that an alleged procedural violation . . . manifest[s] 
concrete injury” if the violation actually harms or presents a 
material risk of harm to the underlying concrete 
interest. Strubel, 842 F.3d at 190 (citing Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 
1549); see also Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108, 1115 
(9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 931 (2018); Braitberg 
v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 836 F.3d 925, 930 (8th Cir. 2016).3 
If the violation does not present a “material risk of harm to that 
underlying interest,” however, a plaintiff fails to demonstrate 
concrete injury. Strubel, 842 F.3d at 190 (citing Spokeo, 136 S. 
Ct. at 1549).4 
                                              
3 In Horizon, we noted that other courts employed a “material 
risk of harm” analysis in determining standing after Spokeo. 
846 F.3d at 637 n.17. On the facts of Horizon, we did not apply 
that approach, concluding that Spokeo did not erect “a 
requirement that a plaintiff show a statutory violation has 
caused a ‘material risk of harm’ before he can bring suit.”  Id. 
at 637 (quoting Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1550). But Horizon 
rejected a requirement that a plaintiff show an additional risk 
of harm when a violation has already harmed a concrete 
interest identified by Congress. As we have explained, the 
alleged injury in Horizon—unauthorized dissemination of 
private information—could “itself constitute a cognizable 
injury,” id. at 638–39, and was “the very injury that FCRA 
[was] intended to prevent,” id. at 640. 
4 This “material risk of harm” standard also strikes a balance 
between Congress’s “power to define injuries and articulate 
chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy 
where none existed before,” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 
(quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
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B. 
Kamal has pleaded two allegedly “concrete” injuries: 
“the printing of the prohibited information itself,” i.e., a 
violation of FACTA’s plain text, and the “increas[ed] risk of 
identity theft” resulting from that printing. App. 104, Sec. Am. 
Compl. ¶ 36. But the procedural violation is not itself an injury 
in fact, and Kamal has not otherwise alleged a risk of harm that 
satisfies the requirement of concreteness.  
 
1. 
In Spokeo, the Supreme Court instructed courts 
determining standing to consider Congress’s judgment, as 
Congress is “well positioned to identify intangible harms that 
meet minimum Article III requirements.” 136 S. Ct. at 1549. 
Based on the plain text of FACTA, which requires truncation 
of all but the last five digits of a consumer’s credit card 
number, we recognize Congress identified the violation alleged 
here. By “creat[ing] a private right of action to enforce” 
FACTA’s provisions and “allow[ing] for statutory damages for 
willful violations,” Horizon, 846 F.3d at 639, Congress has 
“expressed an intent to make [the] injury redressable,” id. at 
637. See Long, 903 F.3d at 323–24. 
 
                                              
(internal quotation mark omitted)), and the requirement that—
absent a statutory right of action—a threatened harm be 
“certainly impending” or based on a “substantial risk” of harm 
to amount to injury in fact, Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 
U.S. 398, 409, 414 n.5 (2013). See Summers, 555 U.S. at 497 
(“[T]he requirement of injury in fact is a hard floor of Article 
III jurisdiction that cannot be removed by statute.”). 
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But the Clarification Act also expresses Congress’s 
judgment that not all procedural violations of FACTA will 
amount to concrete harm. The congressional findings 
underlying the Act are directed to the risk incurred by printing 
the expiration date when the card number is properly truncated. 
Though expiration date truncation is not at issue here, 
Congress’s action to limit FACTA liability to those claims 
implicating actual harm accords with our understanding of 
Article III. Cf. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (explaining that a 
plaintiff does not “automatically satisf[y] the injury-in-fact 
requirement whenever a statute grants a person a statutory 
right” because “Article III standing requires a concrete injury 
even in the context of a statutory violation”). Accordingly, we 
next consider whether Kamal has pleaded a concrete injury. 
 
2. 
 As noted, in determining whether “an alleged intangible 
harm” is concrete, Spokeo directs us to “consider whether [the] 
harm has a close relationship to a harm that has traditionally 
been regarded as providing a basis” for a common law action. 
136 S. Ct. at 1549; see also Horizon, 846 F.3d at 637 
(explaining that if the alleged harm closely relates to a 
traditional harm, “it is likely to be sufficient to satisfy the 
injury-in-fact element of standing”). Kamal contends his injury 
is analogous to common law privacy torts and an action for 
breach of confidence. Because Kamal’s alleged injury is 
different in kind than the harms “providing a basis” for these 
common law actions, we disagree. 
 
 Harms actionable under traditional privacy torts include 
“unreasonable intrusion upon . . . seclusion,” “appropriation of 
the other’s name or likeness,” “unreasonable publicity given to 
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the other’s private life,” and “publicity that unreasonably 
places the other in a false light before the public.” Long, 903 
F.3d at 324 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 
652A(2)(a)–(d) (1977)). The most analogous tort here is 
unreasonable publicity, which, as we explained in Horizon, 
protects against “unauthorized disclosures of information.” 
846 F.3d at 638 (quoting Nickelodeon, 827 F.3d at 274); 
accord Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 489 (1975) 
(noting that the “gravamen” of the injury in a public disclosure 
case “is the publication of information”). Similarly, a breach of 
confidence involves “the unconsented, unprivileged disclosure 
to a third party of nonpublic information that the defendant has 
learned within a confidential relationship.” Alan B. 
Vickery, Note, Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort, 82 
Colum. L. Rev. 1426, 1455 (1982); see also McGuire v. 
Shubert, 722 A.2d 1087, 1091 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (breach of 
confidence requires “banker [to] divulge to third persons, 
without the consent of the customer . . . any information 
relating to the customer acquired through the keeping of his 
account” (quoting Peterson v. Idaho First Nat. Bank, 367 P.2d 
284, 290 (Idaho 1961))). Importantly, the harm underlying 
both of these actions transpires when a third party gains 
unauthorized access to a plaintiff’s personal information. 
 
Kamal’s injury does not have the requisite “close 
relationship” with these actions because he does not allege 
disclosure of his information to a third party. See Spokeo, 136 
S. Ct. at 1549. Instead, he pleads only that he “received” a 
FACTA non-compliant receipt after each transaction. App. 97, 
Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 8. As Kamal points out, our precedent does 
not require an “exact historical analog,” Appellant’s Br. at 20, 
and we have recognized Congress’s ability to define injuries 
that would not “give rise to a cause of action under common 
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law,” Horizon, 846 F.3d at 639. Yet we still require the harm 
be “of the same character of previously existing ‘legally 
cognizable injuries.’” Susinno, 862 F.3d at 352 (quoting 
Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549). For example, in Susinno, although 
the alleged single unwanted telephone call was not the 
persistent hounding required to state a claim for intrusion upon 
seclusion, the harm was similar and thus appropriate for 
Congress to elevate to a concrete injury. Id. at 351–52. As 
Spokeo reminds us, because comparison to “historical 
practice” helps us understand the type of harm that meets 
Article III’s case-or-controversy threshold, it is important that 
the relationship be “close.” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549. Absent 
disclosure to a third party, Kamal’s injury is unlike the harms 
recognized by traditional causes of action. Accordingly, 
historical practice does not weigh in favor of finding a concrete 
injury on the facts pleaded here. See id. 
 
3. 
But the Supreme Court has explained that a “risk of real 
harm” may “satisfy the requirement of concreteness.” Id. 
Kamal maintains this inquiry is irrelevant because he has 
pleaded the violation of a “statutory right to remedy an 
‘intangible harm,’” itself sufficient to confer standing. 
Appellant’s Br. at 24. He points to a passage in Spokeo, where 
the Court explained that “the violation of a procedural right 
granted by statute can be sufficient in some circumstances to 
constitute injury in fact. In other words, a plaintiff in such a 
case need not allege any additional harm beyond the one 
Congress has identified.” 136 S. Ct at 1549. But this passage 
lends no help to Kamal. “The emphasized phrase ‘additional 
harm’ clearly presumes that the putative plaintiff had already 
suffered a de facto injury resulting from the procedural 
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violation.” Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Transp., 879 F.3d 339, 343 (D.C. Cir. 2018). Because the 
FACTA violation alleged by Kamal is not itself a concrete 
injury, his case does not present the circumstances envisioned 
by Spokeo. Kamal also points to Horizon, where we said that 
under the FCRA “Congress established that the unauthorized 
dissemination of personal information by a credit reporting 
agency causes an injury in and of itself—whether or not the 
disclosure of that information increased the risk of identity 
theft or some other future harm.” 846 F.3d at 639. Again, in 
Horizon, it was the alleged injury’s close relationship to a 
traditional harm that showed it was sufficiently concrete to 
create standing. Here, absent unauthorized third-party 
disclosure, Kamal’s alleged FACTA violation is not “an injury 
in and of itself.” Accordingly, we will evaluate whether the 
FACTA procedural right protects a concrete interest, and if the 
violation alleged by Kamal entails a degree of risk sufficient to 
meet the concreteness requirement. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 
1549–50. 
 
As we have noted, the FACTA provision at issue was 
part of Congress’s effort to prevent the concrete harm of 
identity theft. See 117 Stat. at 1952; accord Bassett v. ABM 
Parking Servs., 883 F.3d 776, 782–83 (9th Cir. 2018) 
(FACTA’s truncation provision seeks to reduce the risk of 
identity theft); Katz v. Donna Karan Co., 872 F.3d 114, 116 
(2d Cir. 2017) (same); Meyers v. Nicolet Rest. of De Pere, LLC, 
843 F.3d 724, 725 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2267 
(2017) (same). Kamal contends we should defer to what he 
sees as Congress’s determination that all conduct prohibited by 
FACTA creates a sufficient risk of identity theft. See 
Appellant’s Br. at 16. As we have described, Kamal’s Second 
Amended Complaint devotes much space to showing that 
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Congress enacted FACTA to combat identity theft. See, e.g., 
App. 104–06, Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 36–41. But the lesson of 
Spokeo is that we must confirm a concrete injury or material 
risk exists even when Congress confers a right of action.5 
Accordingly, we will review the Second Amended Complaint 
to see if it “clearly and specifically set[s] forth facts” showing 
a risk of harm particular to Kamal. Reilly, 664 F.3d at 41 
(quoting Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 155 (internal quotation mark 
omitted)). 
 
Kamal’s Second Amended Complaint broadly alleges 
that J. Crew’s printing of the first six digits of his credit card 
number “created a real risk of identity theft.” App. 117–18, 
Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 99, 101, 103; see also App. 104, Sec. Am. 
Compl. ¶ 36. These conclusory allegations of risk are 
insufficient. See Horizon, 846 F.3d at 633 (noting “threadbare 
recitals of the elements of standing, supported by mere 
conclusory statements” are “disregard[ed]” at the motion to 
dismiss stage (internal citation omitted)). Instead, Kamal must 
                                              
5 Furthermore, the congressional “[f]act-[f]inding” Kamal 
relies on is not particularized to his alleged injury. Appellant’s 
Br. at 12. Kamal does not point us to any part of the 
congressional record that considers the risk of identity theft 
when only the first six and last four digits of a consumer’s 
credit card are printed on a receipt. Instead, he notes that 
“[e]xperts . . . recommended [to Congress] that card numbers 
not be printed in full on receipts, because card numbers are 
particularly dangerous in the hands of sophisticated criminals.” 
Id. at 13 (emphasis added); see also App. 104, Sec. Am. 
Compl. ¶ 37. Because Kamal has not alleged that J. Crew 
printed his card number “in full,” these congressional findings 
of risk are not tailored to the FACTA violation he has pleaded. 
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plausibly aver how J. Crew’s printing of the six digits presents 
a material risk of concrete, particularized harm. 
 
The closest the Second Amended Complaint comes to 
alleging material risk of harm is its allegation that “identity 
thieves . . . obtain Card receipts that are lost or discarded, or 
through theft, and use the information on them to commit fraud 
and theft.” App. 101, Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 28. As the District 
Court explained, this threat consists of a “highly ‘speculative 
chain of future events,’” Kamal, 2017 WL 2587617, at *5 
(quoting Reilly, 664 F.3d at 46): “Kamal loses or throws away 
[the receipt], which is then discovered by a hypothetical third 
party, who then obtains the six remaining truncated digits 
along with any additional information required to use the card, 
such as the expiration date, security code or zip code.” Id. 
Kamal has alleged neither third-party access of his 
information, nor that the receipt included enough information 
to likely enable identity theft. Our analysis would be different 
if, for example, Kamal had alleged that the receipt included all 
sixteen digits of his credit card number, making the potential 
for fraud significantly less conjectural. Here, however, we 
agree with the District Court that this speculative chain of 
events does not constitute a material risk of harm.6 
                                              
6 Our opinion in Horizon supports this conclusion. In Horizon, 
although we did not rely on a “risk of harm” analysis because 
the unauthorized dissemination of the plaintiffs’ personal 
information was itself a concrete injury, we also found the 
alleged data breach created a material risk of identity theft. 846 
F.3d at 639 n.19. Specifically, we noted the stolen information 
was highly personal and could be used to steal one’s identity, 
and the personal information was easily accessible because 
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In responding to J. Crew’s motion to dismiss and in his 
briefing on appeal, Kamal attempts to supplement his 
Complaint by referring to a study and accompanying press 
release that he contends shows “the concrete risk that 
publication of card numbers creates.” Appellant’s Br. at 15 
(citing Mohammed Aamir Ali et al., Does the Online Card 
Payment Landscape Unwittingly Facilitate Fraud?, 15 IEEE 
Security & Privacy, Mar–Apr. 2017, at 78–86). Because this 
study was not attached to or referenced in Kamal’s pleadings, 
we do not consider either the study or Kamal’s “after-the-fact 
allegations” related to the study “in determining the sufficiency 
of [the] complaint.” Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 
201–02 (3d Cir. 2007).  
 
Although we do not consider it, we observe the study is 
not relevant to Kamal’s allegations. The study describes how 
hackers—who begin with none of a consumer’s credit card 
details—can exploit weaknesses in online payment systems to 
generate usable card payment details, including card numbers, 
expiration dates, and card verification value (CVV) numbers. 
Ali et al., supra, at 78. First, the hacker can theoretically obtain 
a valid full card number using the first six digits and a common 
algorithm. Id. at 81. Because this method generates a valid card 
number (as opposed to a random collection of digits), it must 
                                              
Horizon’s laptops were unencrypted. Id. Here, no information 
has been stolen or disclosed, and even if there was disclosure, 
the information could not easily be used to steal Kamal’s 
identity because, as pleaded, a thief would still need to “pick 
off” the remaining “different bits of information from different 




also be verified. Id. Once verified, the hacker can use that 
anonymous card number on multiple merchants’ online 
payment pages to systematically guess the remaining card data. 
Id. at 80. In light of these system weaknesses, the study advises 
online merchants to uniformly require three fields of card data 
(card number, expiration date, and CVV) for a purchase, as 
doing so would mean “the difference between a quick and 
practical attack, and a tedious, close to impractical attack.” Id. 
The study thus concerns vulnerabilities in online payment 
systems that allow hackers to obtain a range of credit card data. 
Kamal’s assertions about the study’s relevance to his claim 
take its language out of context and distort its conclusions. 
Compare Appellant’s Br. at 15, with Ali et al., supra, at 80.7 
 
In sum, absent a sufficient degree of risk, J. Crew’s 
alleged violation of FACTA is “a bare procedural violation” 
                                              
7 Moreover, consideration of the study and accompanying 
press release would—were it part of our analysis—add 
additional support for our conclusion that Kamal has not 
alleged actual harm or material risk of harm. The press release 
says that “the first six digits” of a credit card “tell you the bank 
and card type and so are the same for every card from a single 
provider.” Six Seconds to Hack a Credit Card, Newcastle 
University (Dec. 2, 2016) (attached as Ex. B. to Frank Decl. 
Supp. Pl.’s Opp. Defs.’s Mot. Dismiss Sec. Am. Compl., 
Kamal v. J. Crew Grp., Inc., D. Ct. Dkt. No. 69-3, Civ. No. 15-
0190 (D.N.J. Jan. 12, 2017)) (emphasis added). Here, the 
receipts Kamal received from J. Crew separately identify his 
card provider, Discover. Taking the press release’s statement 
as true, the inclusion of the first six digits provides no more 
information than is already permissibly printed on the receipt, 
and so could not increase the risk of identity theft. 
27 
that does not create Article III standing. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 
1549. This result falls within the Supreme Court’s admonition 
that when Congress “adopt[s] procedures designed to decrease 
th[e] risk” of harm to a concrete interest, “[a] violation of one 
of th[ose] procedural requirements may result in no harm.” Id. 
at 1550. 
C. 
 Our conclusion is in keeping with the decisions of the 
majority of our sister circuits that have addressed similar 
issues. 
 
 In Katz, the Second Circuit determined a plaintiff lacked 
standing in a FACTA case based on the improper truncation of 
the plaintiff’s credit card number. 872 F.3d at 116. The court—
which addressed a factual challenge to standing—agreed with 
the trial court that printing the first six digits was a “bare 
procedural violation” of FACTA that “did not raise a material 
risk of harm of identity theft.” Id. at 121. The court deferred to 
the trial judge’s factual finding that printing the first six digits 
was “the equivalent of printing the name of the issuing 
institution, information which need not be truncated under 
FACTA,” and thus did not increase the risk of harm. Id. at 120. 
 
But in Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., 905 F.3d 
1200 (11th Cir. 2018), the Eleventh Circuit found the same 
alleged FACTA violation “create[d] a concrete injury,” id. at 
1211, “the unlawful disclosure of legally protected 
information,” id. at 1210 (quoting Nickelodeon, 827 F.3d at 
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274).8 The court reached this conclusion after finding the 
FACTA violation was similar to a common law breach of 
confidence action. Id. at 1209. As we have explained, we do 
not believe a breach of confidence action is sufficiently 
analogous absent third-party disclosure. The Eleventh Circuit 
recognized this incongruity, acknowledging the breach of 
confidence tort is “complete after the person entrusted with 
property or information gives it to a third party.” 905 F.3d at 
1211.9 Because Kamal has not alleged disclosure to a third 
                                              
8 In Muransky, the Eleventh Circuit upheld a $6.3 million 
FACTA class action settlement over an appeal by objecting 
class members. 905 F.3d at 1204–05. The parties reached the 
settlement in 2015—before the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Spokeo—and the defendant never challenged the plaintiff’s 
standing. Instead, an objecting class member first raised 
standing at the trial court’s final approval hearing for the 
settlement. Id. at 1206. 
9 Moreover, the sources cited in Muransky recognize that a 
breach of confidence requires unauthorized disclosure to a 
third party. See McCormick v. England, 494 S.E.2d 431, 438 
(S.C. Ct. App. 1997) (“A confidential relationship is breached 
if unauthorized disclosure is made to only one person not a 
party to the confidence.” (quoting Breach of Confidence: An 
Emerging Tort, 82 Colum. L. Rev. at 1442)); Alicia Solow-
Niederman, Beyond the Privacy Torts: Reinvigorating A 
Common Law Approach for Data Breaches, 127 Yale L.J. 
Forum 614, 633 (2018) (noting that a breach does not take 
place until the data holder’s “operations in fact permit a breach 
of that [personal] data”); Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. 
Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of 
Confidentiality, 96 Geo. L.J. 123, 135 (2007) (“[D]uties of 
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party, we disagree that a “close relationship” to a breach of 
confidence exists, and do not find a concrete injury on this 
basis.10 
 
Although the Eleventh Circuit did not reach the “risk of 
harm” analysis, it admonished courts that have “incorporated 
the fact findings” from other courts’ opinions “into [their own] 
legal analysis that FACTA violations do not create a concrete 
injury.” Muransky, 905 F.3d at 1213. The District Court here, 
in addition to finding the risk of harm too speculative, also 
found no material risk of harm because printing a credit card’s 
first six digits “gives an identity thief no more personal 
information about a person’s account than Congress has 
permitted to be printed on receipts.” Kamal, 2017 WL 
                                              
nondisclosure attached to confidential relationships prohibited 
a person from divulging confidential information to any 
unauthorized person.”). 
10 The Eleventh Circuit held that besides alleging a concrete 
injury on the basis of the statutory violation, the plaintiff 
alleged an additional concrete injury: “shouldering the cost of 
safely keeping or destroying the receipt” to “avoid someone 
finding [the] credit card number on [the] receipt.” Muransky, 
905 F.3d at 1211. This injury was not alleged in Kamal’s 
Second Amended Complaint and so was not addressed by the 
District Court’s opinion. Because it was not raised by Kamal, 
we need not speculate about how such an allegation might 
change the standing analysis. Cf. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 155–
56 (“A federal court is powerless to create its own jurisdiction 
by embellishing otherwise deficient allegations of standing.”). 
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2587617, at *4 (quoting Noble v. Nev. Checker CAB Corp., No. 
15-2322, 2016 WL 4432685, at *3 (D. Nev. Aug. 19, 2016)). 
Because we are presented with a facial challenge to standing, 
we must consider only the Complaint, viewing it in the light 
most favorable to Kamal. In this context, we agree with the 
Eleventh Circuit that we cannot “rely on facts established in . . 
. older cases.” Muransky, 905 F.3d at 1214; accord S. Cross 
Overseas Agencies, Inc. v. Wah Kwong Shipping Grp., 181 
F.3d 410, 426 (3d Cir. 1999) (“To resolve a 12(b)(6) motion . 
. . we may [not] take judicial notice of another court’s opinion 
. . . for the truth of the facts recited therein.”).11 Accordingly, 
our determination that Kamal has not alleged a concrete injury 
does not incorporate this analysis. We instead affirm, as 
explained above, on the grounds that Kamal’s alleged injury is 
not itself concrete and the alleged risk of identity theft is too 
speculative to satisfy the requirement of concreteness. 
 
The Ninth and Seventh Circuits have reached 
conclusions similar to ours in cases involving violations of 
FACTA’s ban on including credit card expiration dates on 
receipts. See Bassett, 883 F.3d at 777; Meyers, 843 F.3d at 
725–26.12 As we do here, the Ninth Circuit rejected the 
                                              
11 As the Eleventh Circuit explained, “[t]here are a number of 
problems with relying on facts found in another FACTA case 
to say [a plaintiff] does not have standing.” Muransky, 905 
F.3d at 1213. For example, the other plaintiffs “may have done 
a poor job at proving standing as a factual matter,” and “in light 
of evolving technology” there are “variations in the amount of 
risk related to different disclosures or data breaches.” Id. 
12 Because these cases involved FACTA’s expiration date 
requirement, these courts relied in part on Congress’s 
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plaintiff’s proposed analogy to “privacy-based torts centered 
on wrongful disclosures of information” because the defendant 
“did not disclose [the plaintiff’s] information to anyone but 
[the plaintiff].” Bassett, 883 F.3d at 780. The court also found 
the risk of identity theft too speculative to amount to a concrete 
injury, “given that [the plaintiff] could shred the offending 
receipt along with any remaining risk of disclosure.” Id. at 783. 
Likewise, in Meyers, the Seventh Circuit determined that a 
restaurant’s failure to truncate the expiration date from a 
receipt did not “create[] any appreciable risk of [identity theft]” 
when the plaintiff “discovered the violation immediately and 
nobody else ever saw the non-compliant receipt.” Id. at 727.  
 
E. 
 Because Kamal lacks standing, we must vacate the 
District Court’s order dismissing the case with prejudice and 
remand for the District Court to dismiss without prejudice. The 
District Court initially dismissed this case without prejudice. 
After Kamal stated his intention to stand on his Second 
Amended Complaint and asked the court to amend the 
disposition to designate it as final, the District Court amended 
the judgment to dismiss the case with prejudice. Nonetheless, 
the case should be dismissed without prejudice because the 
                                              
statement in the Clarification Act that “failure to truncate a 
card’s expiration date, without more, does not heighten the risk 
of identity theft.” Meyers, 843 F.3d at 727; see also Bassett, 
883 F.3d at 783. As we have stated, these congressional 
findings in the Clarification Act are not directly relevant to our 
analysis of Kamal’s standing. But because both Bassett and 
Meyers reached other pertinent conclusions in applying 
Spokeo’s framework, we discuss them here. 
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District Court lacked jurisdiction. See Cottrell v. Alcon Labs., 
874 F.3d 154, 164 n.7 (3d Cir. 2017) (stating that “[b]ecause 
the absence of standing leaves the court without subject matter 
jurisdiction to reach a decision on the merits, dismissals ‘with 
prejudice’ for lack of standing are generally improper”). 
Accordingly, we will remand for this limited purpose. 
 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s judgment that Kamal lacks standing. But we will 
vacate and remand for the District Court to dismiss the Second 
Amended Complaint without prejudice. In light of our 
decision, we need not reach J. Crew’s cross-appeal, and we will 
dismiss it as moot. 
